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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze how variations in partisan representation across different levels of
government influence Americans’ satisfaction with the democracy in the United States. We
conduct two survey experiments and analyze data from the 2016 American National Election
Study postelection survey. We find that Americans are the most satisfied with democracy when
their most preferred party controls both the federal and their respective state governments.
However, we also find that even if an individual’s least preferred party only controls one level of
government, they are still more satisfied with democracy than if their most preferred party
controls no levels of government. These findings suggest that competition in elections across both
the national and state government, where winning and losing alternates between the two parties,
may have positive outcomes for attitudes toward democracy.
Keywords: satisfaction with democracy; elections; federalism

When I talk to people in my hometown of Austin, they want to move to
Portland because the whole state is Democratic.
—Bill Bishop, author of The Big Sort1
American voters want their preferred party to have political power. And having
this power has important consequences for how citizens view their government—
Democrats showed more satisfaction with, and trust in, the federal government under
Presidents Clinton and Obama than Republicans did, but this pattern completely
reversed under Presidents Reagan, Bush and Bush (Pew Research Center 2015).
1
Quote from an interview of Bill Bishop by Matt Carmichael, June 20, 2017 https://livability.com/topics/
moving/why-youre-better-off-moving-than-voting
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However, in the United States, there are many opportunities for one’s own party to have
some governmental power. This can occur within the federal government, where parties
have opportunities to control the Presidency, Senate, and House of Representatives,
in state governments, where similar mixes of control can occur between the executive
and the legislature, and even at the local (city or county) level with mayors, county
commissions, and city councils. This American federalism provides partisans multiple
opportunities for their preferred party to be in control of government. But, the above
quote from Bill Bishop suggests that partisans crave increasing amounts of co-partisan
government control—those in a Democratic city in a Republican state like Austin would
prefer to move to Portland, a Democratic city in a Democratic state.
In American politics, scholars have observed increasingly tenuous support for
American political institutions among the public (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). We
argue that having one’s preferred party in control of government should serve to
increase satisfaction with democracy and support for democratic institutions in the
United States. Just as individuals have more support for government institutions when
their preferred party is in power, they should also have more generalized support for
democracy. As voters become more partisan and begin to care more about partisan
outcomes instead of the quality democratic processes (Levendusky 2009; Mason 2018),
their support for democratic institutions may diminish overtime, especially if their
party is out of power. Yet, federalism could mitigate this process. As long as a voter’s
preferred party wins elections at one level of government, they should still be somewhat
satisfied with the democratic process and somewhat likely to support democratic
institutions than if their most preferred party did not control any levels of government.
In this paper, we analyze how variations in partisan representation across different
levels of government influence Americans’ satisfaction with the democracy in the
United States (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Anderson et al. 2005). We argue that
Americans are the most satisfied with the democratic process when their most
preferred party controls both the federal and their respective state governments.
However, we also argue that even if an individual’s least preferred party only controls
one level of government, they would still be more satisfied with democracy than if
their most preferred party controls no levels of government. That is, partisan control
of government should influence not only how individuals feel about political outcomes, but it should influence their views of the democratic system as a whole.
This provides a unique insight into state politics in the United States. Given that
state-level political decisions are often so consequential for citizens (Bowling and
Pickerill 2013), it is perhaps unsurprising that citizens would care about state-level
political outcomes. However, the considerable extant research on electoral outcomes
and satisfaction with democracy focuses heavily on national level election outcomes.
Given that support for political institutions and democracy in general is so vital to the
health of democracy (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018), state-level outcomes that give
citizens more of a chance to “win” could benefit the health of democracy generally,
if citizens are more supportive of democracy given that their preferred party controls
at least one level of government.
To analyze the effect of federal and state partisan control on Americans’ satisfaction with democracy, we use data from the two experimental studies and the 2008 and
2016 American National Election Study (ANES). The data from the experimental
studies allow us to analyze how respondents react when different parties hypothetically win state and federal elections, and how those reactions influence their
satisfaction with democracy. Since respondents in the experiments all had the equal
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chance of their preferred party hypothetically controlling their state and/or federal
governments, we are able to account for differences in partisan type (Democratic or
Republican), which is not possible using survey data, where partisan control of
government is fixed at each point in time. Nevertheless, it is also important to
determine how actual partisan representation influences voters’ actual satisfaction
with democracy. Hence, we also analyze real-world ANES data from 2008 and 2016.
The results of both experimental studies and the ANES analysis demonstrate that
voters become more satisfied with democracy as the number of levels of government
their most preferred party controls increases. Citizens are the most satisfied with
democracy when their most preferred party controls both the state and federal
government and the least satisfied with democracy when their least preferred party
controls both the state and federal government. When their preferred party controls
only one level of government, citizens remain more satisfied than if they control no
levels, but less satisfied than citizens with dual control. We also find that these results
are generally the strongest for stronger partisans. Note that these findings are in direct
contrast to findings of previous studies that suggest while partisan representation at
the federal level has a strong impact on satisfaction with democracy, partisan
representation at the local level does not (Henderson 2008; Singh, Lago, and Blais
2011).
In the next section, we develop our theoretical argument while drawing upon
several studies that analyze factors that influence satisfaction with democracy. We
then analyze data from our two experimental studies and analyze data from the
ANES. We conclude by discussing how the results of our analysis speak to the
literature on support for democratic institutions in the United States.

Variations in Satisfaction with Democracy
There are a variety of factors that might influence individuals’ satisfaction with the
democratic process. One primary factor is whether a citizen’s preferred party controls
key policymaking institutions. Generally speaking, citizens who identify with parties
or candidates that control key policymaking institutions in government are more
satisfied with democracy than citizens who identify with opposition parties
(Anderson and Guillory 1997; Anderson et al. 2005; Anderson and Tverdova 2001;
Blais, Morin-Chassé, and Singh 2017; Howell and Justwan 2013; Singh, Karakoç, and
Blais 2012). When a citizen’s most preferred party or candidate controls key policymaking institutions, they likely develop policies the citizen supports, and when a
citizen’s least preferred party or candidate controls key policymaking institutions,
they may develop policies that the voter dislikes. As such, it not surprising that voters
are more satisfied with democratic outcomes when their most preferred party
controls key policymaking institutions (Curini, Jou, and Memoli 2015; Ferland
2016; Reher 2014; Stecker and Tausendpfund 2016).
Beyond policymaking, citizens likely care about which parties control key policymaking institutions because of the psychological response citizens have to election
outcomes. Citizens tend to have strong partisan attachments in the United States, and
the parties are increasingly becoming sorted along ideological lines (Levendusky
2009; Mason 2018). As such, citizens have an increasing affective, or emotional,
attachment to their parties (Mason 2018; Spoon and Kanthak 2019). Individuals may
then feel more positive emotions when their preferred party wins an election, and
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more negative emotions when they lose. These feelings may impact satisfaction with
democracy. Due to their positive emotional response to election outcomes, citizens
may become more satisfied with democracy the more often their most preferred party
wins. Likewise, due to their negative emotional response to election outcomes,
citizens may become less satisfied with democracy the more often their preferred
party loses (Anderson et al. 2005; Curini, Jou, and Memoli 2011; Singh 2014).
While citizens become less satisfied with the democratic process when their
preferred party does not control key policymaking institutions, institutional arrangements can influence how dissatisfied they are with the democratic process. Under
majoritarian institutional arrangements, majority interests tend to be well represented in the policymaking process while minority interests are not. In particular,
single member district, plurality rule elections tend to repress the number of parties
that can realistically win elections and control key policymaking institutions. Additionally, single member district, plurality rule elections can also lead to disproportionate election results, where one party gets a much larger seat share than their vote
share. This could lead to the overrepresentation of the winning party and the
underrepresentation of the losing party. Furthermore, unitary institutions only allow
for representation at one level of government. In conjunction with single member
district, plurality rule elections, this implies that only the interests of the winning
majority party are represented in the policymaking process at one level of government. Thus, policy tends to follow the interests of the majority party in government
and excludes the preferences of opposition party. As a result, it is not surprising that
citizens who identify with opposition parties are very unsatisfied with democratic
outcomes in these types of systems (Anderson et al. 2005; Berhard, Nordstrom, and
Reenock 2001; Ezrow and Xezonakis 2011; McDonald, Mendes, and Budge 2004;
Powell 2000; VanDusky-Allen 2017).
In contrast to majoritarian arrangements, under consensual arrangements, multiple interests are represented in the policymaking process. In particular, proportional representation elections may allow multiple parties to win elections and
collectively control key policymaking institutions. Furthermore, federal arrangements allow multiple parties to compete for control over key policymaking institutions at several levels of government. Since no one single party or interest has a
majority control over a key policymaking institution, multiple parties and interests
must form coalitions and compromise in the policymaking process. As a result, policy
outcomes tend to be more moderate (McDonald, Mendes, and Budge 2004; Norris
1999; Powell 2000).
Since multiple parties are involved in the policymaking process and policy outcomes are more moderate in consensus democracies than majoritarian democracies,
citizens who identify with opposition parties are less unsatisfied with democracy in
consensus democracies than in majoritarian democracies. For citizens in consensus
democracies, even if their party does not win, another party with similar preferences
may be involved in the policymaking process, closely representing their interests.
Additionally, citizens who identify with opposition parties may prefer the more
moderate policy outcomes under consensual institutions over the more extreme ones
that could happen under majoritarian institutions (Anderson and Guillory 1997;
Anderson et al. 2005; Bernauer and Vatter 2011; Ezrow and Xezonakis 2011; Lijphart
1984, 1999; Miller and Listhaug 1990; VanDusky-Allen 2017).
While majoritarian institutions enhance opposition party supporters’ dissatisfaction with democracy while consensual institutions reduce opposition party
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supporters’ dissatisfaction with democracy, most countries do not have purely
majoritarian or consensual institutions. Instead, they have a mixture of both. Herewith in we focus on how a mixture of consensual and majoritarian institutions in the
United States influences satisfaction with democracy. In particular, we focus on how
the interaction between federalism, a characteristic of consensual democracies, and
single member district, plurality rule elections with two major political parties,
characteristics of majoritarian democracies, influence satisfaction with democracy.
Federal institutional arrangements give voters multiple opportunities to elect
representatives at different levels of government. In conjunction with single member
district, plurality rule elections with two major political parties, this could lead to a
variety of election outcomes for voters in the United States. At one extreme, citizens
can have limited partisan representation in government, where both their state and
the federal government are controlled by their least preferred party. On the other
extreme, citizens can have full partisan representation at all levels of government,
where both their state and federal government are controlled by their most preferred
party. Another likely alternative is that citizens could have full partisan representation at one level of government but not the other (Anderson and Guillory 1997;
Anderson et al. 2005; Blais and Gélineau 2007).
Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that individuals may, at some level, be
interested in geographically sorting into areas where their political identity is in the
majority. Bishop (2009) notes that geographic clustering of individuals in the United
States has created politically homogenous communities. However, these claims are
not without critique, as county-level party registration fails to show a similar pattern
(Abrams and Fiorina 2012). Later work has demonstrated that partisanship, while a
smaller factor than a host of others, plays a role in internal migration decisions in the
United States, especially for Republicans (Tam Cho, Gimpel, and Hui 2013). Regardless of the true level of effects of partisan geographic sorting, it seems likely that this is
a consideration for some people. This suggests that state-level electoral outcomes can
influence a host of political attitudes, even satisfaction toward democracy.
The extent to which a citizen’s most preferred party controls the state and/or local
governments should affect the extent to which they are satisfied with democracy. If a
citizen has limited partisan representation at the federal and state levels, they should
be the least satisfied with democracy. In contrast, if a citizen has full partisan
representation at the federal and state levels, they should be the most satisfied with
democracy. Next, if a citizen has full partisan representation at one level but not
another, they should be moderately satisfied with democracy. While they may not be
fully represented in the policymaking process, they are represented at least at one
level. As such, while they should be less satisfied with democracy than they would
otherwise be if they had full partisan representation at all levels, they should be more
satisfied with democracy than someone with limited partisan representation at all
levels. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: As co-partisan control over government increases, satisfaction with
democracy increases.
While increased co-partisan control over government should have a positive effect
on satisfaction with democracy, citizens might care more about co-partisan control of
one level of government over another. Yet, it is not entirely straightforward as to
which level of government should matter more, the federal government or the state
government. There are reasons why citizens could care about both.
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Given the evolution of the federal government’s policymaking powers throughout
the 20th century, it is clear why citizens should care about co-partisan control over
the federal government. Due to this expansion of its policymaking powers, the federal
government adopts policies that affect a wide range of activities in states nationwide.
In some cases, states may be willing to work with the federal government to pass and
implement policies. In other cases, the federal government may have to coerce state
governments to pass and implement policies through regulations and financial
pressure (Bowling and Pickerill 2013). As such, citizens may care deeply about
who controls the federal government as the federal government has a great deal of
influence over the policymaking process at the state level.
On the other hand, states still play an important role in the policymaking process.
State governments have taken the lead in developing state level policies in several
different policy areas, such as in environmental policy, marriage and family policies,
health care, education, marijuana policy, land management, and gun rights. Recently,
it has been the states leading the fight against COVID-19 in the US states. It is also
important to note that states often have a strong influence over the implementation of
federal policy at the state and local level (Bowling and Pickerill 2013). As such,
citizens may be acutely aware of the impact that state level governments have over
public policymaking and therefore should prefer that their preferred party controls
the state government.
Given that the federal government has become increasingly powerful over time,
citizens may care more about co-partisan control over the federal government than
their own state government. Alternatively, since states are willing to fight back against
perceived federal overreach while at the same time engaging in their own policy
innovations at the state level, citizens may care more about co-partisan control over
the state government than the federal government. Hence, we have two different
expectations as to how co-partisan control at different levels of government should
influence satisfaction with democracy. Co-partisan control over the federal government could have a stronger positive effect on satisfaction with democracy than
control over state level government. Or co-partisan control over state governments
could have a stronger positive effect on satisfaction with democracy than control over
the federal government. This discussion leads to the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: Compared to no co-partisan control, federal co-partisan control
has a stronger positive effect on satisfaction with democracy than it does on state level
government control.
Hypothesis 2b: Compared to no co-partisan control, state co-partisan control has
a stronger positive effect on satisfaction with democracy than it does on federal level
government control.
While co-partisan control over different levels of government might influence
satisfaction with democracy for most citizens, we also suspect that strong partisans
may care more about which parties control different levels of government than weak
and leaning partisans do. These stronger affective partisan attachments among strong
partisans (Mason 2018) should cause partisan control of government to matter more
to these individuals. Strength of attitudes and attachments are correlated with
perceived importance of these attachments (Petty and Krosnick 1995), suggesting
that strong partisans may view partisan control of government as more important
than weaker and leaning partisans. Partisan leaners also engage with politics differently than stronger partisans, the latter of who are more driven by ideological
concerns (Klar 2014). As such, the effect of co-partisan control over government
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should exert a greater positive effect on strong partisans’ satisfaction with democracy
than it does over weaker partisans’ satisfaction with democracy. This discussion leads
to Hypothesis 3:
Hypothesis 3: The positive effect that co-partisan control has on satisfaction with
democracy becomes stronger as the strength of partisanship increases.
In order to provide support for our hypothesis, we conducted two survey experiments and analyzed data from the ANES in 2008 and 2016. We first chose an
experimental design because we wanted to analyze how respondents reacted when
different parties hypothetically controlled different levels of government. This
allowed us to control out for other factors that might influence citizens’ reactions
to partisan representation, such as elected officials’ characteristics. Additionally, in
the experiments, respondents all had the equal chance of having partisan representation at both levels of government, no partisan representation at any level of
government, or partisan representation at one level of government but not another.
This is not possible with real world data as particular types of respondents would be
more likely to fit within these different categories. Nevertheless, we also felt it was
important to determine how actual partisan representation affected actual satisfaction with democracy. Hence, we also analyzed real-world ANES data from 2008 and
2016. We discuss the results of the experiments and ANES analysis below.

Survey Experiments
In our first survey experiment, we recruited participants from undergraduate courses
at a regional state university in the Fall of 2018. Students were recruited from a variety
of courses, though mostly were political science or criminal justice majors. Students
participated in a multi-module omnibus study in exchange for extra credit in their
courses. A total of 370 students participated in this study. As expected with a student
sample, the sample skews young, with an average age of 22, ranging from 18 to 67.
The sample was largely female, at just under 61%, and heavily white, at just over 78%.
About 46% of the sample identified as Democrats or leaners, 41% Republicans or
leaners, and 13% pure independents.
Our second study was conducted in March 2019 on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(mturk). Using mturk allows us to recruit a more diverse sample than is available
using undergraduate students. In this study, we recruited participants2 from mturk’s
platform to complete a short study, which averaged about 3 minutes to complete, in
exchange for a payment of 50 cents. The sample’s age ranged from 18 to 77, with an
average of 37. The sample was about 55% male, and 45% female, and about 71%
white. As is typical in mturk samples, the sample skewed Democratic—about 57% of
the sample identified as Democrats, 31.5% Republican, and 11.5% pure independents.
In each study, participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental
groups, after answering a series of demographic questions. Participants read a brief
text, asking them to imagine a state where partisan control varies at the state and
federal level. The text reads as follows:

2
Participants were required to be located in the United States, have a 95% total approval rating for all
completed tasks, and have completed at least 100 total tasks on mturk.
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Imagine you live in a state in the United States where [Republicans/Democrats]
control the state legislature and the governor’s position. Additionally, at the
federal level, [Republicans/Democrats] control Congress and the Presidency.
This created a traditional 2  2 experimental design, where partisan control of the
state government varied between Republicans and Democrats, and partisan control
of the federal government varied between Republicans and Democrats. Key for our
predictions is the number of levels of government controlled by one’s own party. In
this case, the variable Hypothetical Co-Partisan Control is coded as 2 if one’s own
party3 controls both the state and federal governments, 1 if one’s own party controls
either the state or federal government, and 0 if the out-party controls both the state
and federal government. Of the 310 respondents retained for analysis in the student
sample, 72 were experimentally assigned to no co-partisan control, 158 to mixed
control, and 80 to complete partisan control. In the mturk sample, of the 886 respondents retained for analysis, 228 were experimentally assigned to no co-partisan
control, 436 to mixed control, and 222 to complete partisan control.
After reading this text, participants were then asked, on a 0–10 scale, their
hypothetical satisfaction with democracy in the United States.4 Higher values indicated
the respondent is more satisfied with democracy, while lower values mean less satisfied.
Based on our expectations in Hypothesis 1, we expected Hypothetical Co-Partisan
Control to have a positive effect on hypothetical satisfaction with democracy.
We also collected data on additional variables to control for demographic factors
that could be correlated with both satisfaction with democracy and partisanship,
since results are conditioned upon an individual’s partisanship (see Kam and Trussler
2017). We collected data on participants’ age, gender (0 for males, 1 for females), and
race (0 for non-white, 1 for white). We additionally collected data on strength of
partisanship and political interest.
We use an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models to analyze the effect of
Hypothetical Co-Partisan Control on Hypothetical Satisfaction with Democracy. We
present the results of the models in Table 1. The coefficients for Hypothetical
Co-Partisan Control are positive and significant at the 0.01 level in both models. The
substantive results suggest that as the number of levels of government controlled by a
respondent’s preferred party increases by 1, they are about one point more likely to
express satisfaction with democracy. These results provide support for Hypothesis 1.
The analyses in Models 1 and 2 treat all levels of hypothetical control the same—as
in, both state and federal hypothetical co-partisan control are treated as equal. As per
out expectations from Hypotheses 2a and 2b, federal co-partisan control and state
co-partisan control may have different impact on satisfaction with democracy, versus
no control. To this end, we turn to another OLS regression models that allow for
variance in the level of co-partisan control. Respondents are coded as controlling Both.
Levels if their party controls both the state and federal government, State Only if
their party controls only the state and not the federal government, and Federal Only if
their party controls only the federal and not the state government. Individuals for
whom their party controls neither level of government are the reference category for
3
Due to these coding rules, pure independents are excluded from all analyses, as we have no a priori
predictions for how they will respond to partisan control of government. Partisan leaners are included.
4
The question text reads: “On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means not satisfied at all and 10 means very
satisfied, how satisfied would you be with the way democracy works in the United States?”
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Table 1. The effect of co-partisan control on satisfaction with democracy

Hypothetical co-partisan control
Age
Gender
Race
Strength of partisanship
Interest
Constant
N
R2

Model 1 (Study 1)

Model 2 (Study 2)

1.092***
(0.214)
0.029
(0.025)
0.508*
(0.308)
0.441
(0.407)
0.489**
(0.197)
0.318**
(0.140)
3.251**
(1.051)
296
0.1374

0.912***
(0.122)
0.014*
(0.007)
0.184
(0.178)
0.071
(0.151)
0.219*
(0.121)
0.090
(0.086)
4.715***
(0.432)
883
0.0700

Note. Table entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.

these analyses. We present the results of the different levels of co-partisan control in
Table 2 and the coefficient plots in Figures 1 and 2.
As shown in Figure 1, when compared to no co-partisan control, the effect of one’s
own party holding both offices remains substantively large in increasing satisfaction
with democracy (β = 2.174, p < 0.01). Next, while there is little evidence to suggest that
participants who had state only control were more satisfied with democracy that
participants who had no co-partisan control, there is some evidence to suggest that
participants who had federal only control were more satisfied with democracy than
participants who had no co-partisan control (β = 1.193, p < 0.01).
As shown in Figure 2, the analysis from Study 2 present a slightly different (or,
perhaps, less statistically ambiguous) story than in Study 1. For Hypothetical Satisfaction
with Democracy, we see that one’s preferred party hypothetically holding both offices
exerts a large effect of nearly two scale points on democratic satisfaction, compared to
holding no offices (β = 1.824, p < 0.01). Meanwhile, both federal (β = 1.109, p < 0.01) and
state (β = 0.874, p < 0.01) co-partisan control predict increases of about a 1 scale point in
satisfaction with democracy, compared to holding no co-partisan office.
These results suggest that partisan control of government clearly has an effect on
satisfaction with democracy. However, it seems to not matter much which level of
control one’s co-partisans hold. While point estimates are slightly higher for federal
control in both studies, compared to only state control, these results are not
statistically distinguishable from one another. These results, then, are not clearly
supportive of expectations from Hypothesis 2a, that suggested that citizens cared
more about federal co-partisan control over government than state control. Here, we
find that, while federal control exerts an effect with a magnitude larger than state
control in both studies, we are unable to statistically distinguish the two estimates.5
5
It is important to note that when we run separate analyzes of these models for Democrats and
Republicans only, the effects of each level of control for each party are statistically indistinguishable from
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Table 2. Effect of levels of co-partisan control on satisfaction with democracy

Both levels
Federal only
State only
Age
Gender
Race
Strength of partisanship
Political interest
Constant
N
R2

Model 3

Model 4

(Study 1)

(Study 2)

2.174***
(0.426)
1.193***
(0.425)
0.482
(0.425)
0.026
(0.025)
0.516*
(0.307)
0.500
(0.408)
0.494**
(0.197)
0.329**
(0.140)
3.475**
(1.065)
296
0.1483

1.824***
(0.243)
1.109***
(0.244)
0.874***
(0.245)
0.014*
(0.007)
0.183
(0.178)
0.071
(0.151)
0.207*
(0.121)
0.089
(0.086)
4.700***
(0.440)
883
0.0712

Note. Table entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis.
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.

Both Levels

Federal Only

State Only

0

1

2

3

Figure 1. Effect of co-partisan control on satisfaction with democracy (Study 1).
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Both Levels

Federal Only

State Only

0

.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

Figure 2. Effect of co-partisan control on satisfaction with democracy (Study 2).
Next, as per Hypothesis 3, we suspect that the effects of Hypothetical Co-Partisan
Control on.
Hypothetical Satisfaction with Democracy may be conditional upon the strength of
one’s partisanship.6 Stronger partisans may care more than less strong partisans
about hypothetical co-partisan control of government. To this end, we turn to an
analysis of Hypothetical Co-Partisan Control conditional on strength of partisanship.
Strength of partisanship is coded as 1 for leaning partisans, 2 for weak Democrats or
Republicans, and 3 for strong partisans. We present the results of this analysis in
Table 3 and in Figures 3 and 4.
The results from Figures 3 and 4 suggest that as strength of partisanship increases,
Hypothetical Co-Partisan Control’s effect on Hypothetical Satisfaction with Democracy
increases. In Study 1, for Leaning Partisans, an increase in co-partisan control did not
seem to influence satisfaction with democracy. But for weak (β = 0.976, p < 0.01) and
strong (β = 1.555, p < 0.01) partisans, as the number of levels of co-partisan control
increased, satisfaction increased. And the effect was strongest for strong partisans.
In Study 2, as the strength of partisanship increases, the positive effect that
co-partisan has on satisfaction with democracy increases. For leaning partisans, a
one level increase in co-partisan control leads to a half point increases in satisfaction
with democracy (β = 0.446, p < 0.10). For weak partisans, a one level increase in
co-partisan control leads to a one-point increases in satisfaction with democracy

each other. However, note that in Study 1, the Federal Only category is insignificant for Republicans but
significant for Democrats, and in Study 2, the Federal Only and State Only categories are insignificant for
Republicans but significant for Democrats.
6
To avoid issues related to conditioning on post-treatment variables, we measure strength of partisanship,
and all other demographics included in all experimental models, prior to the experimental treatments.
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Table 3. The effect of co-partisan control on satisfaction with democracy conditional on strength of
partisanship

Hypothetical co-partisan control
Strength of partisanship
Strength of partisanship*hypothetical co-partisan control
Age
Gender
Race
Interest
Constant
N
R2

Model 5

Model 6

(Study 1)

(Study 2)

0.183
(0.650)
0.118
(0.352)
0.579**
(0.279)
0.289
(0.025)
0.505*
(0.306)
0.437
(0.405)
0.330**
(0.139)
4.539***
(1.215)
296
0.1502

0.060
(0.378)
0.162
(0.201)
0.386**
(0.162)
0.013*
(0.007)
0.177
(0.177)
0.097
(0.151)
0.091
(0.086)
5.546***
(0.555)
883
0.0760

2
1.5
1
.5
0
-.5

Marginal Effect of Co-Partisan Control

Note. Table entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.

Leaning

Weak
Strength of Partisanship

Strong

Figure 3. The marginal effect of co-partisan control conditional on strength of
partisanship (Study 1).
(β = 0.832, p < 0.01). And for strong partisans, a one level increase in co-partisan
control leads to a one-point increases in satisfaction with democracy (β = 1.218,
p < 0.01). Taken together, these results provide substantial support for Hypothesis 3.
We also analyze the effects of different levels of co-partisan control (Both Only,
Federal Only, and State Only) on satisfaction with democracy conditional on strength
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Figure 4. The marginal effect of co-partisan control conditional on strength of
partisanship (Study 2).
of partisanship. We present the results of this analysis in Table 4 and in the coefficient
plot in Figures 5 and 6. The results from Figure 5 demonstrate that leaning partisans
show no effect of the treatment on their satisfaction with democracy. Yet, both weak
(β = 1.941, p < 0.01) and strong (β = 3.063, p < 0.01) partisans show increased satisfaction with democracy when their preferred party controls both levels of government, compared to none. Additionally, weak (β = 1.134, p < 0.01) and strong (β =
1.443, p < 0.05) partisans show increased satisfaction with democracy when their
preferred party controls the federal government only, compared to none.
We repeat this analysis for Study 2, shown in Figure 6. The results suggest that
treatment effects are once again mostly pronounced for weak and strong partisan
respondents, not leaning partisans. Control over both levels of government predicts
about a 2.4 point increase in satisfaction for strong partisans (β = 2.432, p < 0.01), about
a 1.7 point increase in satisfaction for weak partisans (β = 1.665, p < 0.01), and nearly a
1 point increase in satisfaction for leaning partisans (β = 0.899, p < 0.10). These were the
strongest observed effects. In contrast, control over the federal government only
predicts nearly a 2-point increase in satisfaction for strong partisans (β = 1.755, p <
0.001) and nearly a 1-point increase in satisfaction for weak partisans (β = 0.857, p <
0.001). And control over the state government only predicts about a 1-point increase in
satisfaction for strong partisans (β = 1.145, p < 0.001) and nearly a 1-point increase in
satisfaction for weak partisans (β = 0.797, p < 0.01). These results provide support for
Hypothesis 3. The positive effect that co-partisan control has on satisfaction with
democracy becomes stronger as the strength of partisanship increases.7
7
When we run the models separately for Democrats and Republicans, the effects of each level of control for
each party are statistically indistinguishable from each other. However, in some circumstances, the effects of
different levels of control have a statistically significant impact on Satisfaction with Democracy for Leaning
and Weak Democrats but not Leaning and Weak Republicans.
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Table 4. Effect of co-partisan control on satisfaction with democracy, conditional on strength of
partisanship
Model 7 (Study 1)

Model 8 (Study 2)

0.302
(1.300)
0.517
(1.270)
0.045
(1.301)
0.056
(0.416)
1.122**
(0.559)
0.309
(0.554)
0.245
(0.561)
0.027
(0.025)
0.509*
(0.306)
0.485
(0.407)
0.339**
(0.139)
4.358**
(1.333)
296
0.1625

0.131
(0.757)
0.940
(0.817)
0.101
(0.751)
0.273
(0.229)
0.767**
(0.325)
0.898***
(0.340)
0.348
(0.323)
0.013*
(0.007)
0.172
(0.178)
0.101
(0.151)
0.091
(0.086)
5.770***
(0.614)
883
0.0808

Both levels
Federal only
State only
Strength of partisanship
Both levels  strength of partisanship
Federal only  strength of partisanship
State only  strength of partisanship
Age
Gender
Race
Political interest
Constant
N
R2

Note. Table entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis.
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.

Taken together, the results of both experimental studies provide robust support
for our hypothesis—when individuals are exposed to some levels of co-partisan
governmental control, they are more likely to express satisfaction with democracy,
than when their preferred party has no control of government.
These effects are heightened by strength of partisanship and control of multiple
levels of government, however we do not see significant differences emerge based on
state only, or federal only, partisan control.
While these results are compelling, they come from only two convenience samples. While mturk and student samples have both been long used in academic
research, they provide some unique barriers compared to a nationally representative
sample—namely, that they are, on average, quite younger, and a bit more educated
(Berinsky et al. 2012). We are less concerned about the age differences between these
samples and nationally representative samples, as age has long been shown to be a
predictor of stronger partisan attachment (see Hobbs 2019). However, in contrast,
higher levels of education, which are exhibited in our samples, is associated with
stronger levels of partisan strength (Clifford 2017). As such, our younger sample
should see lower effects of partisanship on attitudes, given that these attitudes are less
crystalized (Hobbs 2019), while our more educated sample might overestimate
effects. Since the samples deviate much more strongly on age, rather than education,
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Figure 5. The effect of CO-partisan control on satisfaction with democracy conditional on strength of partisanship (Study 1).
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Figure 6. The effect of CO-partisan control on satisfaction with democracy conditional on strength of partisanship (Study 2).
from nationally representative samples, we are less concerned that our effects are
overestimated.
However, demographic differences are not the only concern with online samples
such as mturk. There has been an increasing rise in automated or fraudulent
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responses on mturk (Kennedy et al. 2020). While generally concerning, this pattern is
less concerning for our purposes. Since these automated responses generally increase
error in experimental research (Kennedy et al. 2020), they would lead to larger
standard deviations in our effects, making it harder to detect statistical differences.
Additionally, we replicate the study on a student sample, which should contain more
attentive respondents, and find similar sized effects, suggesting that we do not have
particular issues with our mturk sample’s quality. However, we realize our experimental findings remain conducted only on convenience samples, and may be
detached from real world effect. Because of this, we turn to our survey data to analyze
the real-world impact of co-partisan control on satisfaction with democracy.

2008 and 2016 American National Election Studies
To provide additional support for our hypotheses, we use data from the ANES
postelection studies in 2008 and 2016. To match the design of our experimental
study, we only use data for participants that lived in states where one party had
unified control over the state government.8 To analyze the effect of variations in CoPartisan Control on Satisfaction with Democracy, we use data from the following
question to measure respondents’ expressed satisfaction with democracy:
“On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at
all satisfied with the way democracy works in the United States?”
We re-code the answers to the question such that higher values indicated a respondent was more satisfied with democracy and lower values indicated a respondent was
less satisfied with democracy.
In the analysis for 2008, the main independent variable, Co-Partisan Control, is
coded as 0 for participants that identified as Republicans and lived in states with
governments controlled by Democrats (i.e., no co-partisan control), 1 for Democrats
and Republicans that lived in states with governments controlled by Republicans
(i.e., one level of co-partisan control), and 2 for participants that identified as
Democrats and lived in states with governments controlled by Democrats (i.e., full
co-partisan control).9 To determine respondents’ partisan identification, we use
questions from the survey that asked respondents if they identified with or were
closer to a Democrat, Republican, Independent, or Other. We only include respondents that identified as Democrats and Republicans, or felt they were closer to
Democrats or Republicans.10
8
While we are not especially concerned with differential levels of attrition in the pre- and post-election
waves, this concern merits some discussion. However, the rates of re-interviews are relatively high for the
ANES (between 80% and 90%), and while research has shown that demographic variables may predict
attrition in longer time horizon panel surveys, there is little evidence that political variables predict attrition
(Frankel and Hillygus 2014). As such, we are not especially concerned that differential rates of attrition in the
pre- and post- election surveys are driving these results.
9
Technically, a Republican controlled the presidency during the 2008 post-election wave and a Democrat
controlled the presidency during the 2016 post-election wave. However, it was clear that Democrats would
soon have unified control over the federal government in 2008 and Republicans would soon have unified
control over the federal government in 2016. We expect that individuals based their opinions on the incoming
Presidents and Congresses, rather than the outgoing ones.
10
All of the demographic variables come from the pre-election survey.
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Table 5. The effect of co-partisan control on satisfaction with democracy (ANES 2008 and 2016)

Co-partisan control
Age
Gender
Race
Income
Education
Strength of partisanship
Interest
Constant
N
R2

Model 9 (2008)

Model 10 (2016)

0.206**
(0.087)
0.007**
(0.003)
0.043
(0.104)
0.020
(0.109)
0.004
(0.011)
0.066*
(0.039)
0.164**
(0.065)
0.004
(0.025)
2.970***
(0.270)
673
0.0595

0.184***
(0.051)
0.010***
(0.002)
0.017
(0.073)
0.125
(0.105)
0.007
(0.006)
0.013
(0.019)
0.150*
(0.048)
0.032
(0.041)
2.779***
(0.234)
1,590
0.0610

Note. Table entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.

In the analysis for 2016, the main independent variable, Co-Partisan Control, is
coded as 0 for participants that identified as Democrats and lived in states with
governments controlled by Republicans (i.e. no co-partisan control), 1 for participants that lived in states with governments controlled by Democrats (i.e. one level of
co-partisan control), and 2 for participants that identified as Republican and lived in
states with governments controlled by Republicans (i.e. full co-partisan control). To
determine respondents’ partisan identification, we once again use questions from the
survey that asked respondents if they identified with or were closer to a Democrat,
Republican, Independent, or Other. Additionally, we only include respondents that
identified as Democrats and Republicans, or felt they were closer to Democrats or
Republicans.
In all our models, we account for various demographic characteristics of the
respondents. We include variables that accounted for respondents’ age, gender, race
(white versus non-white), income, and education. We additionally account for
strength of partisan identification (0 for independent leaning partisans, 1 for “Weak”
partisans, and 2 for “Strong” partisans) and political interest, as in the previous
studies. We present the results of both models in Table 5.
The results in Table 5 provide support for Hypothesis 1. The coefficients for CoPartisan Control are positive and significant in both models. And the values of the
coefficients are quite similar in both models. The results suggest that in both 2008 and
2016, as the number of levels of government a respondent’s preferred party increased
by 1, they were about 0.2 units more satisfied with democracy.
Next, as in the previous analyses, we analyze the effect of State Level Only control,
Federal Level Only control, and Both Levels of control against No Control (the
excluded category) on Satisfaction with Democracy. We present the results in
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Table 6. Effect of levels of co-partisan control on satisfaction with democracy (ANES 2008 and 2016)

Both levels
Federal only
State only
Age
Gender
Race
Income
Education
Strength of partisanship
Political interest
Constant
N
R2

Model 11 (2008)

Model 12 (2016)

0.503***
(0.170)
0.614***
(0.182)
0.373*
(0.190)
0.007**
(0.003)
0.055
(0.104)
0.035
(0.104)
0.004
(0.010)
0.081**
(0.038)
0.182***
(0.064)
0.001
(0.026)
2.711***
(0.298)
673
0.0774

0.364***
(0.101)
0.027
(0.119)
0.000
(0.111)
0.010***
(0.002)
0.017
(0.074)
0.144
(0.105)
0.008
(0.006)
0.012
(0.019)
0.151***
(0.050)
0.030
(0.040)
2.828***
(0.232)
1,590
0.0659

Note. Table entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis.
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.

Table 6 and Figures 7 and 8.11 The results re-iterate that co-partisan control
influences satisfaction with democracy, although the results were different for 2008
and 2016. In the 2008 model, experiencing at least one level of co-partisan control
exerts a positive effect on Satisfaction with Democracy. Individuals who experience at
least one level of co-partisan control were between 0.5 and 0.6 units more satisfied
with democracy versus individuals who did not experience any level of co-partisan
control. In contrast, in the 2016 model, only full co-partisan control had a positive
effect on Satisfaction with Democracy. Individuals who experience full co-partisan
control (in this case, Republican respondents living in states with Republican control)
are about 0.4 units more satisfied with democracy, compared to those with no
control. State only control (Democrats living in states with Democratic control)
and federal control only (Republicans living in states with Democratic control) have
no effect on satisfaction with democracy.
The differences between the results for the 2016 models are striking. It appears
that, based on the results from Models 11 and 12 and Figures 7 and 8, Republicans in
2008 were at least somewhat more satisfied with democracy if Republicans controlled
their respective state governments versus no Republican control. But in 2016, they
were only more satisfied with democracy versus no co-partisan control if they had full
co-partisan control, meaning they lived in states controlled by Republicans. If they
11

Results are substantively and statistically similar when state-level fixed effects are included.
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Figure 7. Co-partisan control and satisfaction with democracy (2008 ANES).
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Figure 8. Co-partisan control and satisfaction with democracy (2016 ANES).
lived in states controlled by Democrats, they were no more satisfied than individuals
with no co-partisan control (i.e., Democrats living in states controlled by Republicans). These results suggest that at least in 2016, Republicans increasingly began to
care more about complete co-partisan control over federal and state governments
versus just one level.
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Table 7. The effect of co-partisan control on satisfaction with democracy conditional on strength of
partisanship (ANES 2008 and 2016)
Model 13 (2008)

Model 14 (2016)

0.197
(0.140)
0.153
(0.137)
0.009
(0.088)
0.007**
(0.003)
0.044
(0.105)
0.021
(0.108)
0.004
(0.011)
0.066*
(0.039)
0.004
(0.025)
2.979***
(0.293)
673
0.0595

0.012
(0.079)
0.007
(0.079)
0.149***
(0.051)
0.010***
(0.002)
0.009
(0.073)
0.141
(0.104)
0.007
(0.006)
0.016
(0.019)
0.030
(0.040)
2.986***
(0.244)
1,590
0.0682

Co-partisan control
Strength of partisanship
Strength of partisanship*co-partisan control
Age
Gender
Race
Income
Education
Political interest
Constant
N
R2

Note. Table entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.

The results for Democrats tell a slightly different story. In 2008, controlling at least
one level of government led Democrats to be more satisfied with democracy versus no
co-partisan control. Even if Democrats lived in states controlled by Republicans, they
were more satisfied with democracy than individuals with no co-partisan control. But
in 2016, Democrats living in states controlled by Democrats were equally satisfied
with democracy as Democrats living in states controlled by Republicans. It is possible
that at least in 2016, Democrats were generally dissatisfied with democracy due to the
tumultuous nature of the 2016 presidential election. Even if they had representation
at the state level, that did not increase their satisfaction with democracy.
Next, to ascertain whether strength of partisanship can alter the effect of CoPartisan Control on Satisfaction with Democracy, we interact levels of co-partisan
control with partisanship strength, as in the previous studies and present these results
in Table 7 and graphically in a marginal effects graph in Figure 9 for the model with
the 2016 ANES results.
The results from the 2016 ANES model provide support for Hypothesis 3. The
results in Figure 9 suggest that as strength of partisanship increases, the effect of
co-partisan control on satisfaction with democracy increases. While co-partisan
control does not seem to influence satisfaction for leaning partisans, it does appear
to have a positive effect on satisfaction for weak and strong partisans.
The results from the 2008 ANES do not suggest that strength of partisanship alters
the impact Co-Partisan Control has on Satisfaction with Democracy. These results in
conjunction with the Models 9 and 10 suggest that the specific effect that Co-Partisan
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Figure 9. The marginal effect of co-partisan control conditional on strength of
partisanship (ANES 2016).
Control had on Satisfaction with Democracy between these two elections changed. In
the post-2008 election period, Leaning Partisans, Weak Partisan, and Strong Partisans
were all equally more satisfied with increased co-partisan control over government. But
in the post-2016 election period, as strength of partisanship increased, the positive
impact that Co-Partisan Control had on Satisfaction with Democracy increased.
As in the previous studies, we also interact different levels of co-partisan control
with strength of partisanship. We present the results in Figures 10 and 11 and Table 8.
In the 2008 study, weak partisans are slightly more satisfied with democracy than
strong and leaning partisans if their preferred party controls at least one level of
government versus none. Substantively these results suggest that in comparison to
Republicans who live in states controlled by Democrats, Weak Democrats are more
satisfied with democracy if Democrats control both levels of government or the
federal level only. Additionally, Weak Republicans are more satisfied with democracy
if they live in states controlled by Republicans versus Republicans who live in states
controlled by democrats. Last, for Strong Democrats, they are more satisfied with
democracy if they experience control over both levels of government.
In contrast, in the 2016 study, having some level of control at the state level seems
to matter a bit more for stronger partisans (i.e., Democrats that live in states
controlled by Democrats), although the effect just passes the threshold from being
statistically indistinguishable from zero. Substantively these results suggest that
Weak and Strong Republicans who live in states with Republican governments are
more satisfied with democracy than Democrats who live in states controlled by
Republicans. Additionally, Strong Democrats who live in states controlled by Democrats may be slightly more satisfied with democracy than Democrats who live in
states controlled by Republicans.
Taken together, these results suggest that in 2008, regardless of their partisan
attachments, respondents were generally more satisfied with democracy as the
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Figure 10. The effect of co-partisan control on satisfaction with democracy conditional on strength of partisanship (ANES 2008).
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Figure 11. The effect of co-partisan control on satisfaction with democracy conditional on strength of partisanship (ANES 2016).
number of levels of government their preferred party controlled increased. But in
2016, this was more the case for individuals with stronger partisan attachments.
Perhaps this has something to do with an increase in partisanship and affective
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Table 8. Effect of co-partisan control on satisfaction with democracy, conditional on strength of
partisanship (ANES 2008 and 2016)

Both levels
Federal only
State only
Strength of partisanship
Both levels  strength of partisanship
Federal only  strength of partisanship
State only  strength of partisanship
Age
Gender
Race
Income
Education
Political interest
Constant
N
R2

Model 15 (2008)

Model 16 (2016)

0.448
(0.276)
0.618**
(0.260)
0.265
(0.282)
0.141
(0.208)
0.053
(0.198)
0.012
(0.235)
0.109
(0.238)
0.007**
(0.003)
0.054
(0.106)
0.025
(0.108)
0.004
(0.011)
0.081*
(0.039)
0.000
(0.027)
2.760***
(0.361)
673
0.0787

0.016
(0.155)
0.115
(0.203)
0.506
(0.183)
0.054
(0.085)
0.298
(0.103)
0.110
(0.151)
0.413
(0.134)
0.010
(0.002)
0.014
(0.073)
0.143
(0.107)
0.008
(0.006)
0.014
(0.018)
0.029
(0.039)
3.078
(0.247)
1,590
0.0788

Note. Table entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis.
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.

polarization from 2008 to 2016 (see Mason 2018), though we are only left to speculate
about these differences.12

Conclusions
We presented evidence from two survey experiments and observational data collected soon after the 2008 and 2016 elections to demonstrate how the levels of
co-partisan control of different levels of government influences Americans’ satisfaction with democracy. As one’s preferred party controls more levels of government,
12
Due to the different political environments and sample sizes between the two surveys, the percentage of
respondents into different subgroups of co-partisan control differed between the two surveys. In the 2008
sample, 29.9% (201) respondents were coded as Both, 35.8% (241) were coded as Federal Only, 23.8% (160)
were coded as State Only, and 10.5% (71) for No Control. In the 2016 sample, 35.7% (568) respondents were
coded as Both, 12.5% (199) were coded as Federal Only, 19.1% (304) were coded as State Only, and 32.6%
(519) for No Control.
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general satisfaction with democracy in the United States increases. This effect is
heightened, especially, among stronger partisans.
This work has important implications for scholars of both American and
comparative politics. While these findings are interesting in the current American
political context, future work could examine whether the findings are time bound
or consistent over time. Additionally, our analysis could be extended to countries
outside the United States where there are variations in the strength of partisan
attachments and variations in the types of democratic political institutions. Such
an analysis would provide further insight into how variations in the strength
of partisan attachments combined with variations in the types of democratic
institutions affect how election outcomes influence voters’ satisfaction with
democracy.
This research has both theoretical and real-world implications. Political competition at the state level is declining (Basham and Polhill 2005; Forgette, Garner, and
Winkle 2009), suggesting that more states are becoming “solidly” Democratic or
Republican. Our results suggest this may have consequences for attitudes toward
democracy in general, where political minorities in these states may only achieve
winning at the federal level, which may damage their long-term overall satisfaction
with democracy. This suggests that competition at the state level where both parties
are equally capable of winning office is essential for citizens’ satisfaction with
democracy.
These results additionally shed greater light on the effect of winning and losing
elections. While considerable work has been done on national winners and losers,
and the conditions under which this effect on satisfaction with democracy are
heightened or muted (see Singh 2014), comparatively little work has been done at
the subnational level. However, some of this work does suggest winning local
elections in both Canada (Blais and Gelineau 2007) and Germany (Singh, Karakoc,
and Blais 2012) does increase satisfaction with democracy, albeit at lower levels than
federal victories. Given the amount of power state governments have in the United
States, we believe we may observe larger effects of controlling state-level governments
on satisfaction with democracy in this context because of that additional power in
local political institutions.
Beyond examining election outcomes, future studies could also examine how
winning and losing influences perceptions of government performance, especially
among strong partisans (Christmann 2018; Quaranta and Martini 2016; Sirovátka,
Guzi, and Saxonberg 2018). It is likely that full winners would be the least critical of
elected officials while full losers would be the most critical. Nevertheless, based on the
results of our analysis, it is also possible that individuals who are winners at one level
of government, either state or federal, might be more critical than full winners but less
critical than full losers.
In an increasingly polarized and ideologically sorted political environment, satisfaction with democratic norms, regardless of outcomes, is imperative for the future
of American democracy. We find that election outcomes, quite troublingly, can exert
large and important effects on how citizens view the democratic process, especially
among the most ardent partisans. These findings suggest that robust competition in
elections across both the national and state government, where winning and losing
alternates between the two parties, may have positive outcomes for attitudes toward
democracy, compared to long periods of single party rule.
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Appendix
Mean sample characteristics.

Age
% Female
% White
% Democrat
% Republican

Age
% Female
% White
Income
Education
Interest

Study 1

Study 2

22.11
60.87
78.26
45.73
40.78

37.12
44.5
71.36
57.14
31.15

ANES 2008

ANES 2016

47.36
57.11
62.40
15.39
3.94
0.24

49.58
52.89
74.83
15.39
11.18
2.49
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